18 May 1959

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN	
	18 May 1959	
	DAILY BRIEF	
	I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC	25X1
	USSR: (The Soviet Union is seeking to exploit any differences between the US and Britain over Macmillan's proposal,	
	endorsed by Khrushchev, for a predetermined number of annual on-site inspections of suspected nuclear explosions. Khrushchev's	25 X 1
	letters of 16 May to President Eisenhower and Macmillan and Gromyko's statements at Geneva are designed to create the im-	
	pression that the way has been opened for an early signing of a test-cessation agreement. Khrushchev probably believes these	
	moves will place the British Government under increasing pres-	o r va
25X1	sure to conclude such an agreement.	2581
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		local Britis dents and su in any signi	abversion across ficant improveme	resentatives rega the borders are u nt in British-Yen	arding border inci- unlikely to result neni relations	
		away from a	fact that Crown P a pro-Soviet line. development of th	London seeks a	period of quiet	
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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Moscow Maneuvering to Divide the West on Test Cessation

Khrushchev's 15 May letters to President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan on a nuclear test-cessation agreement are a further effort to divide the United States and Britain by endorsing Macmillan's proposal for a predetermined number of annual on-site inspections of suspected nuclear explosions. Khrushchev's letter to President Eisenhower accepting in part the Western proposal for further technical discussions on condition they are limited to discussion of high altitude detection follows pressure by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in private talks in Geneva with his American and British counterparts for immediate initialing of a test-cessation agreement in principle. Moscow thereby seeks to avoid technical discussions on underground tests and on the criteria for determining the number of on-site inspections. Khrushchev's letters repeated the Soviet position that fixing the number of inspections must be a high-level political decision. He noted also that the West "takes into account our view that such inspections should not be numerous."\

(Khrushchev and Gromyko reaffirmed the Soviet position that unanimity of the three nuclear powers would not be required for the dispatch of inspection teams if agreement is reached on the number of inspections. They also expressed confidence that none of the powers would violate an agreement once it was signed.

Moscow probably estimates that the United States will continue to reject any solution to the test-cessation problem which does not determine the number of annual inspections on the basis of scientific data. Khrushchev probably hopes that his latest letters, couched in optimistic terms, will impress world public opinion with the seriousness of the Soviet negotiating posture and with the progress being made toward easing international tension.)

Khr	ushchev ' s	warm not	e to Ma	acmillan i	referring t	o the '	'close-
ness of o	our positi	ons on you	ır idea''	is proba	bly calcula	ted to	place

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the British Government under increasing pressure at home to con-	25X1
clude a test-cessation agreement. Moscow also apparently hopes that any differences between the United States and Britain on this issue could be exploited to advance Soviet objectives on other ques	
tions under negotiation at the foreign ministers' conference and a possible future summit meeting.	25X1
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Prime Minister Bandaranaike Moves to End Ceylon's Cabinet Crisis

Prime Minister Bandaranaike on 15 May moved to end his cabinet crisis, which began on 6 May when 10 moderate ministers threatened to resign if extreme leftist Agriculture Minister Gunawardena were not fired. He announced on that date that he personally will administer the system of agricultural cooperatives and food distribution through which Gunawardena had been accused of spreading Marxism and increasing his own power. Gunawardena, who will remain in the cabinet, will deal only with matters involving agricultural production.

The moderate cabinet group, hesitant to force the fall of the government and thus precipitate new national elections, reportedly has accepted Bandaranaike's compromise proposal. Gunawardena is expected to announce on 19 May whether or not he will accept this blow to his prestige and remain in the government. Meanwhile, he apparently is attempting to put pressure on Bandaranaike by indicating the parliamentary strength he could withdraw from the government coalition.

on Bandaranaike by indicating the parliamentary strength he could withdraw from the government coalition.

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Should Gunawardena and his followers leave the government, Bandaranaike's, 56-member coalition would lose its majority in the 101-man parliament. However, Bandaranaike's prospects of replacing possible defectors with conservative opposition elements who do not wish new elections are better than Gunawardena's chances of rallying enough leftist support to bring down the government. It seems likely, therefore, that Gunawardena would prefer to retain his privileged position within the government rather than to lose virtually all his influence by resigning.

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While Governor General Goonetilleke has indicated that both he and the prime minister would prefer that Gunawardena resign,

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probably will attempt to persuade Gunawardena that sion to the moderates is a tactic to maintain the state that the state of the state	his conces-	
thus to protect both his and Gunawardena's position.		25X1
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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

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